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This study examines the extent to which strikes diffuse across sectors
and to what extent this diffusion of strikes can be explained by sim-
ilarities and interdependencies between sectors. For this purpose, the
authors examine a unique temporally disaggregated and dyadic data-
base on strikes in Dutch sectors during the 1995–2007 period. Based
on a series of discrete-time event-historymodels, their study clearly sup-
ports the relevance of intersectoral interdependencies to understand-
ing when strikes in one sector are followed by strikes in other sectors.
Sector-to-sector labor mobility has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on
the diffusion of strikes across sectors.
INTRODUCTION
Strikes are not isolated events. Industrial action often occurs in waves or
cycles and may spread across a country like a forest ﬁre ðBiggs 2005Þ. In
the literature, the dominant approach to explain why strikes may appear in
waves or clusters is that strike patterns are reﬂections of the business cycle
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and the bargaining rhythm: strike waves follow changes in production, labor
markets, and bargaining relations ðFranzosi 1995; Brandl and Traxler 2010;
Vandaele 2011Þ. An alternative explanation, however, has received far less
attention: the diffusion of strikes. To explain the spatial and temporal clus-
tering of events and behavior, a rapidly increasing number of studies in the
social and political sciences are examining processes of diffusion ðcf. Strang
and Soule 1998; Elkins and Simmons 2005Þ. Diffusion or contagion effects
have been used to explain a wide range of phenomena, including patterns
of policy adoption ðBerry and Berry 1990; Volden 2006; Sluiter 2012Þ, orga-
nizational founding ðHedström 1994Þ, waves of sit-ins ðAndrews and Biggs
2006Þ, street protests ðJung 2010Þ, riots ðMyers 2010Þ, and more violent forms
of conﬂict ðHolden 1986; Hegre et al. 2001; Gleditsch 2007; Buhaug and
Gleditsch 2008; Schutte andWeidmann 2011Þ.
With respect to industrial conﬂict and labor protest, only a few studies
have investigated whether contagion or diffusion occurs and to what extent
the outbreak of a strike may stimulate further strike activity. Conell and Cohn
ð1995Þ examined strikes in French coal mines in the 1890–1935 period, and
Biggs ð2005Þ investigated strike patterns in late 19th-century Chicago and
Paris. Conell and Cohn suggest that strikes transmit information that stim-
ulates mobilization elsewhere. These authors conclude that temporal cluster-
ing of industrial action occurs because workers in one location learn about
other people’s grievances, demands, strategic opportunities, and bargaining
conditions. The notion that industrial action propagates from one group of
workers to another is also found in a study byBiggs ð2005Þ. He suggests that
strikes are inspirational for others because they create momentum for work-
ers deciding when to start a strike, and they shape expectations of success.
Biggs ﬁnds that strike waves are characterized by a power law distribution,
or a “forest ﬁre model,” in which a strike is likely to spread to more ﬁrms
when a large number of ﬁrms are already involved.
In this article, we study the diffusion of strikes in the Netherlands. In doing
so, we make three contributions to the literature. First, the few existing stud-
ies on strike diffusion provide evidence for the temporal and spatial diffu-
sion of strikes ðConell and Cohn 1995; Biggs 2005Þ, but they pay relatively
little attention to what conditions this diffusion. In the current study, we will
use diffusion theories to formulate hypotheses on the conditions under which
one strike is followed by the next. As diffusion theories dictate, we speciﬁ-
cally investigate the effects of similarities and interdependencies between
the actors or units involved. We test our hypothesis on the conditions of strike
diffusion using data on the Netherlands for the period 1995–2007. In doing
so, this study provides a strict test case for the general claim that the occur-
rence of one strike increases the probability of another. Compared to other
advanced economies, strikes are relatively rare in the Netherlands. If the dif-
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fusion of strikes occurs in this setting, we would expect this phenomenon to
be even more pronounced in more strike-prone contexts.
Second, we analyze the diffusion of strikes using an event-history approach.
Event-history analysis has been suggested to be the most appropriate method
for analyzing protest events and the diffusion of collective action ðOlzak 1989;
Jung 2010Þ. One of the merits of event-history analysis is that it does not re-
quire temporal aggregation and therefore retains exact information on the
timing of each action. Event-history techniques have been widely used in the
protest and conﬂict literature to explain the diffusion of collective action
ðMyers1997, 2000, 2010;Soule 1997, 1999;Olzak,Beasley, andOlivier 2002;
Andrews and Biggs 2006; Braun and Koopmans 2010Þ. In strike research,
however, most published strike statistics are aggregated to annual totals,
making it impossible to determine the exact timing of strikes. The historical
data used by Conell and Cohn ð1995Þ and Biggs ð2005Þ are rare exceptions
of data sources on industrial conﬂict disaggregated to daily time series. The
temporally disaggregated data on the Netherlands that we use for our event-
history analysis are virtually unparalleled as they provide detailed day-to-day
statistics on strikes for a relatively long period.Moreover, the availability of
several secondary data sources allows for a combination of time-varying,
unit-speciﬁc variables explaining strikes, with relational variables between
units to assess the conditions of strike diffusion.
Finally, the scope of our study covers nearly all areas of economic activity.
Instead of focusing on diffusion within a single industry, such as the mining
sector ðConell and Cohn 1995Þ, we examine the diffusion of strikes across
sectors. In the literature, the notion of strike diffusion often entails the assump-
tion that strike waves occur because workers are inspired by others, including
strikers in other industries and in other economic activities ðShorter and Tilly
1974; Cronin 1979; Franzosi 1995Þ. An example of this phenomenon in the
U.S. labor relations context is the 2014 strikes and labor actions of Wal-Mart
employees, who were inspired by the strikes of fast-food industry employ-
ees, with respect to both the wage demands and the means of protesting,
“borrow½ing several publicity-winning ideas from the fast-food movement”
ðTabuchi and Greenhouse 2014, para. 14Þ. Another recent example, from
the Dutch context, is the protest actions of academic personnel in Amster-
dam against university budget cuts, which were directly inspired by a large
strike in the Dutch cleaning industry. In a union magazine, one of the uni-
versity’s protest leaders speciﬁcally declared that they “got carried away by
the militant attitude ½of the cleaners on their campus” and that they “learned
a lot from their ways of protesting” ðAklalouch 2014, para. 4Þ. While both
examples illustrate that strikes spread from one sector to another, there is
little systematic empirical evidence for the extent to which a strike in one
sector stimulates strike incidence in other sectors.
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In sum, this study examines the extent to which strikes diffuse across sec-
tors and to which the diffusion of strikes across sectors can be explained by
similarities and interdependencies between sectors. For this purpose, and
using several sources of time-varying and relational information on Dutch
industries, we construct a sector dyad period ﬁle, a “stacked” data matrix in
which the sector dyads ði.e., the pairs of two sectorsÞ, observed at a daily in-
terval, are the units of analysis. By formally measuring and modeling the
effects of these sector-to-sector linkages on the temporal clustering of strikes,
we answer the following central question: To what extent do strikes diffuse
across sectors and to what extent is the diffusion of strikes across sectors con-
ditioned by similarities and interdependencies between sectors?
DIFFUSION THEORY AND STRIKES
The core argument of diffusion studies in the social movement, protest, and
conﬂict literature is that events do not occur in isolation and the occurrence
of one event affects the probability of the occurrence of another. By impli-
cation, diffusion processes require that the actors or units under study con-
stitute a social system that “channels” diffusion ðRogers 1995Þ. Actors are as-
sumed to respond when those to whom they are socially connected adopt a
trait or practice ðStrang 1991Þ. On the basis of the diffusion literature, we
consider two general mechanisms through which actors inﬂuence each other:
learning by information spillover and adaptation by interdependency ðElkins
and Simmons 2005Þ. Diffusion via learning implies that the initial action pro-
vides information about the consequences of that action and the conditions
under which it occurred and that other actors use this information to assess
the costs and beneﬁts of adopting the same action in their own situation. From
this perspective, strikes stimulate new strikes because workers in one location
learn about the grievances, demands, strategic opportunities, and bargaining
conditions elsewhere. Diffusion via adaptation occurs when the initial action
changes the conditions under which new actions take place, creating exter-
nalities for other actors. From this perspective, strikes diffuse across time and
place because a strike in one location can then affect production and working
conditions in other ﬁrms and sectors. Aswe discuss below inmore detail, both
mechanisms lead us to expect that there is a relationship between the oc-
currence of a strike in one sector and the probability of a strike in another.
In the next sections, we elaborate on the conditions under which these pro-
posed diffusion mechanisms may occur.
Diffusion by Learning
The ﬁrst mechanism underlying the processes of diffusion is that actors in one
location or at one moment may learn from the actions of others at another
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place or time. The notion that protest strategies and repertoires can be
learned from others can be found, for example, in McAdam’s ð1995Þ discus-
sion of the interplay between “initiator movements,” such as Solidarity in
Poland or the American civil rights movement, and the “spinoff movements”
that draw their inspiration from the initiators. Other examples of the dif-
fusion of protest tactics include the development of student protests in the
United States in the 1980s ðSoule 1997Þ, the mobilization of workers in the
1969 “autonno Caldo” ðFranzosi 1995Þ, and the global spread of suicide pro-
tests in the 20th century ðBiggs 2013Þ. For a more extensive overview of the
role of learning in the diffusion of social movements, see Givan, Roberts, and
Soule ð2010Þ and Wang and Soule ð2012Þ.
Diffusion by learning has also been applied to explain the temporal and
spatial clustering of industrial conﬂict. The assumption that workers learn
from the prior actions of others is prominent in Conell and Cohn’s ð1995Þ
study of the diffusion of strikes in French coal mines. They discuss three
possible ways in which learning occurs. The common argument in these
explanations of why strikes may stimulate further worker mobilization is
that they involve some form of information transfer. First, these authors as-
sume that labor protest raises workers’ consciousness by making them aware
of new potential grievances. News about strikes elsewhere can start the dis-
cussion on working conditions at the workplace and can transform latent
complaints into concrete and articulated demands. Second, they argue that
prior strikes function as an occasion for protest. Workers often need an arbi-
trarydate to represent a focuspoint for collectiveaction.Therefore, strikes, like
the ritualized May Day protests, “serve to notify the rest of the labor move-
ment that the time to strike is now” ðConell and Cohn 1995, p. 369Þ. Finally,
strikes are assumed to provide tactical guidance. Conell and Cohn argue that
other workers’ protests provide information on the relative strength of work-
ers and authorities and on the tactical opportunities in parallel settings.
Theories on learning often stipulate that the mere availability of infor-
mation is not sufﬁcient to cause the imitation of a certain practice; instead,
learning from other people’s actions would be conditional on the degree
of proximity or similarity between the actors or units involved. In the liter-
ature, proximity is usually conceptualized in spatial or geographical terms.
Spatial proximity is assumed to ease interactions between actors and to pro-
vide “the best summary of the likelihood of mutual awareness and interde-
pendence” ðStrang and Soule 1998, p. 275Þ. Similarity is normally understood
in terms of shared characteristics and may function as an indicator of prox-
imity in a social sense, as the reverse of social distance ðMcAdam and Rucht
1993; Strang andMeyer 1993; Strang andTuma 1993;McAdam, Tarrow, and
Tilly 2001; Braun and Koopmans 2010Þ. The idea is that information trans-
mitted by prior actions elsewhere is more readily accessible, relevant, and
easily interpreted if the units are more closely located to each other or share
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similar characteristics ðAgrawal, Kapur, and McHale 2008Þ. Studying U.S.
student protests in the 1980s, Soule ð1997Þ showed that protest strategies
diffuse most rapidly among campuses with similar structural characteristics,
such as endowment levels and prestige rankings. With respect to the dif-
fusion of ethnic conﬂict, Braun andKoopmans ð2010Þ found that violent be-
havior against immigrants in Germany in the 1990s wasmore likely to spread
across counties that shared similar political, socioeconomic, and demographic
structures, such as the level of right-wing party support, the amount of agrar-
ian employment, and the percentage of immigrants.
In this study, we build on the idea that proximity fosters diffusion by
learning. In doing so, however, we will not consider proximity in spatial terms.
Examining spatial proximity would require a different research design with
different units of analysis. Sector dyads, the units of analysis in the current
study, cannot be linked to a speciﬁc geographical location. None of the sec-
tors under study is restricted to a speciﬁc region in the Netherlands, let alone
to a speciﬁc municipality or city. Rather than focusing on spatial proximity,
we therefore focus on social proximity. For clarity, we will refer to social
proximity as similarity for the remainder of this study. In the current re-
search setting, similarity entails the characteristics of sector dyads ði.e., the
similar features of two sectors in a pairÞ that advance information spillover
about strikes.
Information about strikes may be transmitted via communication through
the social network of actors ðe.g., employees, strikers, management, and pro-
fessional negotiatorsÞ involved in the strike in one sector and the actors work-
ing in another sector ðor actors involved in upcoming wage negotiations in
that sectorÞ. For example, a union negotiator in the construction sector may
discuss a strike with his colleague who prepares negotiations for the manu-
facturing sector; alternatively, a worker from the manufacturing sector meets
actors from the transport sector during professional interaction ðe.g., day-to-
day professional encounters or occupational courses and networks, such as
business meetings or director interlocks ½Burt 1983 and professional associa-
tions or unionsÞ. In addition to interaction in work-related networks, employ-
ees may exchange information about the strike during private interactions,
such as during leisure activities or family gatherings ðGould 1991Þ.
The probability of such social interaction in, and the diffusion of infor-
mation through, social networks, and thus the exchange of information about
a strike, increase when the workers of two sectors share more similarities
with respect to their occupation, skills, and level of education ðMarsden 1988;
Schneider et al. 1997; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001Þ. Informa-
tion on bargaining outcomes elsewhere, including strikes, may be more rel-
evant and more easily interpreted for workers, negotiators, and manage-
ment when they take place in sectors with similar skill levels. It is important
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to note, however, that the channels of information spillover are not exclu-
sively relational ðor dyadicÞ in nature. For one, information on a strike ðe.g.,
about the union’s demands and strategy, the employer’s response, and em-
ployees’ level of militancyÞ may be transmitted via mass media. The visibil-
ity of a strike via the media probably depends on the size of the ﬁrm, the
participation rate, and the societal and economic impact of the strike. Mas-
sive protests are more likely to draw ðnationalÞ media attention compared
to smaller protests ðMyers 2000Þ. It is likely that workers at a ﬁrm in sec-
tor A may learn about what is going on in sector B through these “non-
relational” channels. Similarity plays a role here, too. When employees are
more similar, the information provided by mass media is more relevant, and
workers can more easily interpret information when it involves strikers who
resemble them. Recent research on the Netherlands has conﬁrmed that dur-
ing collective bargaining, negotiators also tend to consider similar settings and
parallel bargaining situations for comparisons ðLehr, Akkerman, and Tor-
envlied 2014Þ. Similar actors serve as a reference group, for instance, for nor-
mative guidance ðMarsden and Friedkin 1993; Passy and Giugni 2001; Diani
2004; Centola andMacy 2007; Lim 2008Þ. In this respect, the so-called thresh-
old models of collective behavior ðGranovetter 1979; Centola and Macy
2007Þ stipulate that workers—even if they already possess the necessary in-
formation on protest strategies and repertoires—may be willing to strike only
if they witness others striking ﬁrst. Employees probably relate more to the
grievances and demands of others when these other employees ðpotentially
with a lower threshold for collective actionÞ are more similar to them, for
instance, with regard to occupation and skill level. Hence, the core propo-
sition based on diffusion by learning is that industrial conﬂict is more likely
to spread from one sector to another when the occupational structure of the
two sectors is more similar:
HYPOTHESIS 1.—A strike in one sector is more likely to stimulate the occur-
rence of a strike in another sector when these sectors have a more similarly skilled
workforce.
Diffusion by Adaptation
An alternative explanation for diffusion, adaptation, does not prioritize in-
formation spillover as the key mechanism for diffusion. Adaptation occurs
when the initial action creates externalities for other actors and changes the
conditions under which other actors operate. A prerequisite for diffusion
through adaptation is that actors are somehow interdependent. Elkin and
Simmons ð2005, p. 42Þ, for example, mention adaptation to altered condi-
tions as a driving mechanism in the diffusion of government decisions. One
country’s adoption of liberal policies to enhance its competitiveness disrupts
the competitive balance for other countries. Consequently, they argue that
Diffusion of Strikes
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policies may diffuse as other countries are pressured to adapt by adopting
similar policies. Another example is the contagious effect of civil wars. Buhaug
and Gleditsch ð2008, p. 221Þ describe how civil war in one country changes
the welfare in neighboring countries through a sudden inﬂux of refugees,
thereby creating strain and stimulating new conﬂict by increasing compe-
tition for resources in the host countries.
From this perspective, strikes may diffuse because a strike in one sector
may subsequently disrupt the production process or service delivery in other
sectors ðPerrone,Wright, and Grifﬁn 1984Þ. As for diffusion by learning, sim-
ilarity and proximity shape the degree of interdependency between sectors
and therefore affect the likelihood that the labor or product market condi-
tions in one sector are affected by a strike in another sector. Proximity in the
chain of production may increase the degree to which a change in wages in
one sector affects the price of production factors in the other sector ðcf. “po-
sitions in the system of economic interdependencies” in Perrone et al. ½1984,
p. 413Þ. Economic interdependencies in the production or service delivery
process are believed to be stronger with larger ﬁnancial ﬂows, that is, the
supply and acquisition of goods and services ðoften assessed in so-called
input-output tables; cf. Mizruchi and Koenig 1986Þ. Especially in the short
run, a strike in one sector can disrupt production in the other ﬁrms or sectors
in the chain of production, for instance, when the strike hinders the trade of
input materials to the ﬁrmðsÞ on strike. When the production or delivery of
materials is disrupted by the strike ðPerrone et al. 1984Þ, it can cause problems
in other ﬁrms, for example, with their ability to maintain current wages or
employment, which in turn may lead to labor strikes in these “affected” ﬁrms.
Hence, the ﬁrst proposition based on adaptation is that industrial conﬂict
is more likely to spread from one sector to another when the production or
service processes of the two sectors are more interdependent.
HYPOTHESIS 2.—A strike in one sector is more likely to stimulate the occur-
rence of a strike in another sector when the degree of interdependence in the
production or service delivery process between these sectors is higher.
Another plausible consequence of a strike is that its outcomes change em-
ployment in a ﬁrm, and subsequently in the ðproximateÞ sectors, via labor
market competition. Standard labor economic principles explain why changes
in employment may cause conﬂict to spread. A successful strike may increase
the price of labor, for example, when unions are able to negotiate higher
wages for their members. Such changes in the price of labor cause a lower
demand for labor ðfor instance, when management decides to invest in tech-
nology to replace manual or administrative laborÞ. Those unemployed in
the more costly sectors will seek employment in other sectors, affecting the
supply of labor in the “receiving” sector. Alternatively, in a tight labor mar-
ket when labor is scarce, favorable outcomes from a strike may increase
employees’ wage demands in other sectors as well. In the aforementioned
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Wal-Mart example ðTabuchi and Greenhouse 2014Þ, the employees’ protest
resulted in an increase of their wage above the federal minimumwage, which
itself is expected to produce a ripple effect and affect wage demands in sec-
tors that compete for the same workers as Wal-Mart, such as health care,
child care, and restaurants ðKrugman 2015;Morath 2015; Neate 2015Þ. Hence,
because ðexpectedÞ changes in labor market conditions affect wage demands
in negotiations ðKaufman 1984; Kaufman and Woglom 1984Þ, strikes may
also diffuse via the effect they have on labor market conditions.2
This form of interdependency between sectors is caused by labor market
competition and is driven by similarity—in this case, similarities in the labor
force. Whether changes in wages lead to wage competition between sectors
as well as the ðthreat ofÞworkers migrating to higher wages depends on the
degree to which the sectors employ similarly skilled workers. Workers who
have skills that are usable in both sectors are likely to make transfers rela-
tively easily from one sector to the other. Hence, for sectors in which em-
ployees share educational and occupational backgrounds, changes in wages
in one sector, which change the demand for labor in that sector, more easily
affect the supply of labor in the other sector ðCörvers and Heijke 2004; Kauf-
man 2007Þ. Therefore, a second proposition based on adaptation is that in-
dustrial conﬂict is more likely to spread from one sector to another when
labor market competition between the two sectors is stronger.
HYPOTHESIS 3.—A strike in one sector is more likely to stimulate the occur-
rence of a strike in another sector when the degree of labor market competition be-
tween these sectors is higher.
STRIKES IN THE NETHERLANDS
We test our hypotheses in the empirical context of the Netherlands. The
Netherlands is generally considered to be a low-strike country. Together
with countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, it has among
the lowest number of lost working days due to strikes in Europe ðPiazza
2005; Vandaele 2011Þ. Yet, strikes are not absent in the Netherlands. For
researchers interested in the frequency of strikes in the Netherlands, there
are two series of statistics available that provide information over a long
period ðVan Cruchten, Kuijpers, and Van der Velden 2006Þ. The ﬁrst is the
Strike Statistics series ðStatistiek WerkstakingenÞ of Statistics Netherlands
ðCBSÞ. These national records are used by the International Labor Orga-
nization to construct harmonized strike statistics for international compar-
2Such effects on labor market conditions may also set in after wage increases due to wage
bargaining without a strike. However, conﬂict over wages often arises as a result of changes
in economic factors causing uncertainty in negotiations ðShalev 1980Þ. In such situations,
strikes are a prelude to the ﬁrst event in the adaptation of changes in the price of labor.
Diffusion of Strikes
1893
This content downloaded from 131.174.168.014 on January 17, 2017 04:17:01 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
isons. The second is the database Strikes in the Netherlands ðStakingen in
Nederland, abbreviated here as SINÞ compiled by Dutch historian Sjaak
Van der Velden. Both series show similar trends with respect to the aggre-
gate annual numbers of strikes or working days lost over recent decades
ðVan Cruchten et al. 2006Þ. However, in all years under study, the number
of reported strikes in the SIN database is larger than that in the CBS strike
series ðsee ﬁg. 1Þ.
Van Cruchten et al. ð2006Þ have noted that differences between CBS and
SIN data arise from differences in the timing of the data collection and the
sources and deﬁnitions that are used. Compared to the CBS series, the SIN
database is based on a wider scope of sources ðe.g., not limited to reports
by the Netherlands National News AgencyÞ and a somewhat broader def-
inition of strikes ðe.g., not limited to strikes that lead to a loss of productionÞ.
For this study, however, the most compelling reason to use the SIN database
instead of the CBS series is the availability of information on the exact tim-
ing of strikes and the companies involved in each strike. Because legal reg-
ulations prevent Statistics Netherlands from publishing information on in-
dividual strikes, the SIN database is the only available data source that is
appropriate for studying the temporal clustering of strikes across sectors.
For a more elaborate comparison of the two series, we refer to Van der
Velden ð2000, 2007Þ, Van der Bie ð2001Þ, and Van Cruchten et al. ð2006Þ.
On the basis of quarterly aggregated SIN data, there is considerable var-
iation in the frequency of strikes across sectors and time ðsee ﬁg. 2Þ. In the
period under study, the manufacturing sector ð132 strikesÞ and the trans-
port and communication sector ð147 strikesÞ were the most strike-prone
areas of economic activity in the Netherlands. The fewest strikes occurred
FIG. 1.—Annual strike frequency in the Netherlands based on CBS and SIN data,
1995–2007. Source for CBS data is Statline ðStatistics Netherlands 2013Þ; source for SIN
data is Strikes in the Netherlands ð2011Þ.
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in the ﬁnancial sector and in the energy and water supply sector ðone strike
eachÞ. The total quarterly number of strikes in the Netherlands varied dur-
ing the period under study between 3 and 15. Typically, multiple sectors ex-
perience strikes around the same time. In almost all quarters during 1995–
2007, strikes occurred “concurrently” in at least two ðand, on average, three
to fourÞ different sectors. On two occasions ð2000/Q1 and 2005/Q2Þ, half of
the sectors under study experienced strikes during the same quarter. This
type of temporal clustering of strike events across sectors is examined in this
study.
DATA AND MEASURES
Sector Dyad Period File
To test our hypotheses empirically, we make use of various data sources
that we compiled into a new data ﬁle. This ﬁle, labeled the Sector Dyad
Period File of Strikes in the Netherlands, 1995–2007 ðSDPF-SINÞ, is a
database providing information on strike events in Dutch economic sec-
tors. The ﬁle covers 14 economic sectors in the Netherlands, deﬁned on the
basis of the Dutch SBI-93 ðStandaard Bedrijfsindeling 1993Þ. The SBI-93
classiﬁcation is comparable to the international NACE divisions ðrev. 1Þ
of the European Commission. The ﬁle includes all economic sectors except
SBI/NACE section P ðprivate households with employed personsÞ and sec-
tion Q ðextraterritorial organizations and bodiesÞ, for which not all statistics
are relevant or available.
Information on the exact timing of strikes in the Netherlands is adopted
from Van der Velden’s SIN database.3 The SIN database, archived by the
International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, contains system-
atic information on no fewer than 16,000 strikes and lockouts, mainly in the
1810–2007 period. For the current data set, only strike actions after Jan-
uary 1, 1995, are taken into account. However, the SDPF-SIN is not simply
a subset of the SIN database. A combination of three characteristics makes
it an unusual standalone database that enables the investigation of the dif-
fusion of strike events across sectors over time: ð1Þ on the basis of detailed
new coding, it links the starting dates of more than 400 strike actions to
speciﬁc one-digit SBI-93 sectors; ð2Þ the ﬁle combines a dyadic structure with
a period structure in which sector dyads ðcombinations of sectorsÞ are the
main units of analysis; and ð3Þ information on the exact timing of strikes in
sectors is merged with a wide range of other time-varying monadic and
dyadic information on Dutch economic sectors.
3The database Strikes in the Netherlands, an updated version of the database accom-
panying the similarly named book ðVan der Velden 2000Þ, was retrieved from the col-
laborative webpage of the International Institute of Social History, available at https://
collab.iisg.nl/web/labourconﬂicts/strikes-in-the-netherlands ðaccessed May 20, 2011Þ.
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Structure of the Data Set
The diffusion of strikes across sectors is examined using a directed-dyad
approach ðVolden 2006Þ. The dyadic structure of the ﬁle implies that neither
strike actions nor sectors are the units of analysis. Instead, the main units
of analysis are sector dyads between two sectors, here denoted as sector A
and sector B. These dyads are observed on a daily interval during the 1995–
2007 period. To account for the direction of diffusion, each pair of sectors
is included in the data ﬁle twice daily ðe.g., the manufacturing sector may
inﬂuence construction and vice versaÞ. The data set thus includes informa-
tion for 182 ði.e., 14 × 13Þ combinations of sectors per day. Hence, the anal-
ysis is based on 182 dyads over a 13-year period with 365 ðor 366 in leap
yearsÞ daily observations per year. The total number of observations in the
database, used in all models, is 864,136.
Dependent Variable: Strike in Sector A
We use a binary dependent variable measuring whether a strike began on
a speciﬁc day in sector A. If a strike lasts multiple days, only the ﬁrst day is
deﬁned as the event day. Moreover, and following Conell and Cohn ð1995Þ,
strike relays or other broader ðunionÞ campaigns consisting of multiple events
around the same issue or following a single strike call are treated as a single
strike, for which the timing is deﬁned on the basis of the ﬁrst day of the ﬁrst
action. The original SIN database contains information on the companies
involved in each action. On the basis of the companies involved, each ac-
tion is assigned a one-digit SBI-93 sector code. In the period under study,
23 strikes appeared to be unclassiﬁable, occurred in the social employment
branch ðWet sociale werkplaatsÞ, or involved the refusal of work by in-
mates ðprisoners’ strikesÞ. Such events could not be linked to a speciﬁc eco-
nomic sector and were therefore discarded when constructing the strike
variable. Moreover, there were 28 strikes for which the exact date is un-
known in the original SIN database ðthree with missing information on the
exact month and 25 with missing information on the exact dayÞ. For 11 of
28 strikes, the exact starting date was retrieved from newspaper sources
using LexisNexis Academic. In total, 402 separate strike eventswere included
in the analysis. Descriptive statistics on the dependent variable and the in-
dependent variables are presented in table 1.
Independent Variable: Strike in Sector B
To examine whether the occurrence of a strike in sector A is affected by
the occurrence of strikes in other sectors, our ﬁrst independent variable is
Strike in Sector B. For each day in a sector dyad, this variable measures
the strike volume in sector B in the preceding period. First, strike volume
Diffusion of Strikes
1897
This content downloaded from 131.174.168.014 on January 17, 2017 04:17:01 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
T
A
B
L
E
1
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
St
at
is
ti
cs
V
ar
ia
b
le
T
yp
e
T
im
e-
V
ar
yi
n
g
R
an
ge
M
ea
n
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
S
tr
ik
e
in
se
ct
or
A
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
A
D
ai
ly
0/
1
.0
06
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s:
S
tr
ik
e
v
ol
u
m
e
in
se
ct
or
B
ðlo
gg
ed
Þ:a
P
re
v
io
u
s
w
ee
k
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
B
D
ai
ly
.0
0
–
14
.5
5
.1
7
P
re
v
io
u
s
tw
o
w
ee
k
s
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
B
D
ai
ly
.0
0
–
14
.5
5
.3
1
P
re
v
io
u
s
m
on
th
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
B
D
ai
ly
.0
0
–
14
.5
5
.5
5
P
re
v
io
u
s
q
u
ar
te
r
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
B
D
ai
ly
.0
0
–
14
.5
5
.9
7
P
re
v
io
u
s
h
al
f
a
ye
ar
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
B
D
ai
ly
.0
0
–
14
.5
5
1.
20
D
ya
d
ic
v
ar
ia
b
le
s:
a
,b
S
k
ill
-l
ev
el
si
m
ila
ri
ty
in
d
ex
ðlo
gg
ed
Þ.
.
.
D
ya
d
ic
Y
ea
rl
y
2.
89
–
4.
58
4.
23
In
p
u
t-
ou
tp
ut
in
de
x
ðlo
gg
ed
Þ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
D
ya
d
ic
Y
ea
rl
y
.0
2–
3.
34
1.
26
L
ab
or
m
ob
ili
ty
in
de
x
ðlo
gg
ed
Þ.
.
.
.
.
.
.
D
ya
d
ic
Y
ea
rl
y
.0
0–
2.
57
.8
0
S
ec
to
r
A
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s:
E
ve
n
t
co
u
nt
er
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
A
D
ai
ly
0
–
10
5
12
.5
2
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e
ag
re
em
en
t
ex
p
ir
at
io
n
s
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
A
M
on
th
ly
0
–
18
1
3.
01
E
co
n
om
ic
gr
ow
th
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
A
Q
u
ar
te
rl
y
2
21
.5
0–
60
.3
0
5.
15
N
u
m
b
er
of
co
m
pa
n
ie
s
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
A
Y
ea
rl
y
18
0–
16
6,
92
5
48
,6
12
.0
8
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
u
n
io
n
m
em
b
er
s
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
S
ec
to
r
A
Y
ea
rl
y
11
.0
0–
50
.0
0
27
.0
2
P
er
io
d
v
ar
ia
b
le
s:
In
ﬂ
at
io
n
ra
te
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
A
ll
se
ct
or
s
M
on
th
ly
.9
0–
4.
90
2.
21
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t
ra
te
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
A
ll
se
ct
or
s
M
on
th
ly
1.
80
–
7.
30
3.
93
S
h
ar
e
la
b
or
p
ar
ty
ca
bi
n
et
p
or
tf
ol
io
s
.
.
.
A
ll
se
ct
or
s
D
ai
ly
.0
0–
.3
8
.2
2
M
on
d
ay
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
A
ll
se
ct
or
s
D
ai
ly
0/
1
.1
4
W
ee
k
en
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
A
ll
se
ct
or
s
D
ai
ly
0/
1
.2
9
a
W
e
ap
pl
ie
d
lo
ga
ri
th
m
ic
tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n
s
to
ac
co
u
nt
fo
r
th
e
sk
ew
ed
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
s
of
th
es
e
v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
b
D
ya
d
ic
m
at
ri
ce
s
fo
r
th
e
d
ya
d
ic
v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
p
re
se
n
ti
n
g
th
e
av
er
ag
e
v
al
u
es
p
er
se
ct
or
p
ai
r
ov
er
th
e
en
ti
re
p
er
io
d
,a
re
re
p
or
te
d
in
ap
p.
ta
b
le
s
A
1–
A
3.
This content downloaded from 131.174.168.014 on January 17, 2017 04:17:01 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
ði.e., the product of the number of strikers and the duration of the strike
in daysÞ is taken to account for the fact that some strikes are more visible
because of their size and media coverage. Both numbers are retrieved from
the SIN database. In the period under study, approximately half of the
strikes in the SIN database are estimated to last less than a day. For these
strikes, duration is coded as half a day ð0.5Þ. For 68 strikes in the period
under study, the SIN database did not contain estimates on the number of
strikers. In 17 of these cases, we were able to ﬁnd reports on the number of
strikers in newspaper sources using LexisNexis Academic. In the remaining
cases, for which information on the number of strikers is missing, strike vol-
ume is exclusively based on duration. Second, the preceding period is deﬁned
as various durations ði.e., the previous week, two weeks, month, quarter, and
the last half yearÞ. With these ﬁve alternative operationalizations or “incu-
bation periods,” we test various durations for the potential effect of strike
volume in sector B on the likelihood of a strike in sector A. Precautions are
taken to eliminate potential sectoral clustering, that is, the effects of pre-
ceding strikes in sector A itself. We therefore include strike volume in sec-
tor B only when no other strike took place in sector A during the designated
period.
Dyadic Variables
Most diffusion studies distinguish between “diffusion variables,”which are
related to the ties between actors, and “intrinsic variables,” which are related
to all internal characteristics of individual actors that “increase or decrease
their propensity to adopt, irrespective of the behavior of others” ðMyers 2000,
p. 180Þ. The focus of this study is on the relational variables—or, more spe-
ciﬁcally, the dyadic variables—that may be associated with the clustering
of strike events across sectors. The diffusion hypotheses are tested by in-
cluding three dyadic variables that provide annual information on the link-
ages between sectors. The ﬁrst dyadic variable is a skill-level similarity index.
Social network research consistently ﬁnds that homophily in education level
is an important predictor for the creation of social ties among alters ðe.g.,
Marsden 1988; Kalmijn 1998; McPherson et al. 2001Þ and therefore for social
interaction. This variable measures the extent to which the distribution of
jobs with different skill levels in sector A corresponds with the distribu-
tion in sector B. Following the Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations 1992
ðSBC92Þ of Statistics Netherlands ð2001Þ, we distinguish between ﬁve dif-
ferent skill levels: elementary-skilled occupations, lower-skilled occupations,
middle-skilled occupations, higher-skilled occupations, and academic-skilled
occupations.Sector-level informationon thedistributionof these categories of
occupations is derived from aggregated information from the Dutch Labor
Force Survey 1995–2007 ðEnquêteBeroepsbevolkingÞ. Tomeasure similarity
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in skill level, we compare for each skill level the percentage of the sector A
workforce and of the sector B workforce with such jobs. The index is calcu-
lated as follows:
Skill-Level Similarity Index
5100−
" ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðElementary A−Elementary BÞ2
q
1 :::1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðAcademic A−Academic BÞ2
q
2
#
:
ð1Þ
The second dyadic variable, an input-output index, expresses the degree of
interdependence in the production or service delivery processes. This in-
dex indicates all ﬁnancial transactions between sector A and sector B ðinput
of sector A from B and output of A to B and vice versaÞ relative to the total
input and output of both sectors. These annual ﬁgures are based on the ﬁ-
nancial relations between sectors in millions of euros in producer prices. We
derived this information from the input-output tables published by Statis-
tics Netherlands for the 1995–2007 period. All numbers are taken from the
input-output tables based on the SBI-93 sector classiﬁcation except for the
dyads including public administration ðLÞ and education ðMÞ. In the SBI-93
classiﬁcation, input/output ﬁgures are not separately available for sectors L
andM. Therefore, a more recent two-digit version of the input/output tables,
SBI-2008 ðStandaard Bedrijfsindeling 2008Þ, was used to proxy and disen-
tangle the numbers for the public administration dyads and education dyads.
The index is calculated as follows:
Input-Output Index 5
ðinput AB1 output ABÞ  2
ðtotal input A1 output AÞ1 ðtotal input B1 output BÞ  100:
ð2Þ
The third variable is an indicator of the degree of labor market competi-
tion between sectors. On the basis of the assumption that changes in labor
market conditions in one sector are more likely to affect the supply of labor
in the other sector when employees can more easily shift jobs between the
two sectors, the degree of intersectoral labor mobility can be used to express
the degree of labor market competition. The labor mobility index is based
on estimates of the total number of job changers ðin thousandsÞ from sec-
tor A to B ðchanges ABÞ and from sector B to A ðchanges BAÞ. These an-
nual numbers are calculated on request by the Centre for Policy Related
Statistics of Statistics Netherlands on the basis of the Dutch Labor Force
Survey 1996–2007. For privacy reasons, Statistics Netherlands does not re-
port changes lower than 1.5. Hence, for the majority of the year dyads ð73%Þ,
we know that the degree of labor mobility is very low, that is, fewer than
1,500 individuals. We also know the total number of changes in sector A
ð
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and sector B ðto any sectorÞ and the total workforce size of sectors. As an
approximation, we therefore imputed the changes below 1.5 relative to the
sector size and the total changes in sectors A and sector B:4
Labor Mobility Index 5
changes AB1 changes BA
workforce A1workforce B
 1;000: ð3Þ
Sector A Variables
To avoid overestimating the diffusion effect on the temporal clustering of
strikes, we account for various “intrinsic”—or sector A–speciﬁc—variables
with respect to changes in the labor market or the business and bargaining
cycle. By including variables for sector A, we account for sector-speciﬁc de-
velopments in the business and bargaining cycle that may affect the prob-
ability of a strike event.
First, a daily varying event counter variable is included, deﬁned as the
cumulative number of strike events in sector A over the last ﬁve years
ðgoing back to January 1, 1990Þ. The event counter is included to control
for differences in the strike proneness of sectors ðBeck, Katz, and Tucker
1998Þ.
Second, we account for the monthly total number of collective agree-
ment expirations. Expiration dates are derived from the Database of Col-
lective Agreements in the Netherlands ð2009Þ from the Amsterdam In-
stitute for Advanced Labour Studies and supplemented with information
from the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. The expira-
tion of a collective agreement usually constitutes the start of negotiations
for a new collective agreement. Although these negotiations can begin months
before the expiration of the contract, most collective agreements in the Neth-
erlands contain a “no-strike” clause ðVisser 1998, p. 306Þ. In principle, this
clause commits a union to refraining from industrial action for the dura-
tion of the contract. Thus, the expiration of the contract constitutes the ﬁrst
“opportunity to strike” ðKaufman 1982, pp. 476–77Þ.
Third, we control for economic growth, measured as the change in the
gross value added ðin basic pricesÞ relative to the same quarter of the pre-
4For these dyads, we estimated the number of changes AB based on the total number
of changes from sector A to any other sector and the total number of changes from any
other sector to sector B. We ﬁrst calculated the total number of changes from A to any
other sector that was not accounted for by the other sector A dyads. Because the number
of changes was, in all cases, not reported for multiple sector A dyads, we then distributed
this estimated remainder among the sector A dyads with missing values. This was done
by ratio: if sector B had a relatively large workforce, it was assigned a number of changers
from sector A that was proportionally higher. Estimates for 1995 were extrapolated on the
basis of a linear trend for the 1996–2000 period. The index expressed all job changes be-
tween sectors A and B relative to the size of the active workforce of both sectors in thou-
sands ði.e., workforce A, workforce BÞ.
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vious year. We derived this information from the quarter accounts of the
Dutch macroeconomic indicators published by Statistics Netherlands. Eco-
nomic growth tends to increase labor power and therefore is generally pos-
itively associated with strikes ðBrandl and Traxler 2010Þ.
Fourth, we control for sector size and include the annual total number
of companies in sector A. This variable measures the absolute number of
companies in sector A. Information is retrieved from the annual accounts
of the macroeconomic indicators published by Statistics Netherlands. The
rationale is that larger sectors, with more ﬁrms, are at greater risk of experi-
encing a strike than smaller sectors with fewer ﬁrms.
Fifth, we include the annual percentage of union members in sector A
because union density has often been linked to a greater strike probability
ðShorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder 1975; Kaufman 1982; Jansen 2014Þ. This
variable is measured as the membership of employees ages 15–64 who work
at least 12 hours per week. The numbers are calculated by the Centre for
Policy Related Statistics of Statistics Netherlands and are based on the Dutch
Labor Force Survey 1995–2007. Statistics Netherlands does not distinguish
between employees working in mining and quarrying ðCÞ and those work-
ing in the manufacturing sector ðDÞ. Hence, the annual organization rates
in both sectors are assumed to be identical.
Period Variables
The ﬁnal set of variables includes non-sector-speciﬁc variables to account
for the fact that under some circumstances, the likelihood of a strike may
increase or decrease for all areas of economic activity simultaneously. Two
variables pertain to the national economic situation: the monthly inﬂation
rate and the unemployment rate. Both are obtained from Statistics Neth-
erlands. Another national condition relates to the political situation. Power
resource theories predict that the presence of left-wing parties in govern-
ment should decrease strike activity by shifting industrial conﬂict from the
workplace to the political arena ðKorpi and Shalev 1979Þ. The presence of
left-wing parties in government is calculated here as the share of cabinet
portfolios held by the PvdA, the Dutch Labor Party. Finally, we include
two dummy variables for Mondays and weekends to capture the start and
end of weekly work schedules and to reduce a potential Monday bias caused
by the fact that strike information, like other protest event data, is partially
based on newspaper sources ðKoopmans and Rucht 2002Þ.
METHOD
For a formal test of our hypotheses, we use event-history analysis. Event
history is an umbrella term for a wide array of statistical techniques that are
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related to the timing of the occurrence of an event. Speciﬁcally, we use a cat-
egory of event-history models that are commonly labeled as “discrete-time
models,” a type that is suitable for dichotomous dependent variables and data
structured in the form of a subject-period ﬁle of discrete time units ðMills 2011,
p. 17; see also Allison 1984Þ. This type of model is especially appropriate when
including time-varying covariates. To test our hypotheses, we perform a probit
regression analysis for the occurrence of a strike in sector A ð0/1Þ based on our
sector dyad period ﬁle. Many diffusion studies have noted that such ðdirectedÞ
dyadsaredependentoneachother ðVolden2006;Boehmke2009;Gilardi 2010Þ.
In our case, as we are estimating the occurrence of a strike in sector A, in-
cluding sector-A-speciﬁc characteristics, dependence may particularly exist
between dyads that share the same sector A.We address this potential depen-
dence by applying a post hoc correction to ensure that all standard errors are
robust for clustering in sector A.
We present two series of probit models estimating the probability of a
strike occurrence in sector A. As a basic model, we include the direct effects
of all four types of independent variables: ð1Þ the occurrence of a strike in
sector B during the designated incubation period, ð2Þ dyadic variables on
the relations between sector A and sector B, ð3Þ monadic variables on the
characteristics of sector A, and ð4Þ non-sector-speciﬁc period variables. The
main purpose of this basic model is to show whether, ceteris paribus, there is
a direct effect of a strike in sector B. Themain focus of this article, however, is
on the extent to which this direct effect is conditioned by the similarities and
interdependencies between sectors. For this purpose, a second series of models
is required that focuses on interaction effects, that is, interactions between
strikes in sector B, on the one hand, and the various dyadic variables on the
other. Formula ð4Þ, for example, speciﬁes the interaction between strikes in
sector B and the skill-level similarity index. We estimate similar interac-
tions with respect to the input-output index and the labor mobility index:
ystrike in sector A 5 a1 bXstrike in sector B 1 bXskill-level similarity
1 bXstrike in sector B  skill-level similarity
1 bXcontrol 1 1   1 bXcontrol k:
ð4Þ
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the results of the analyses of the basic models with ﬁve dif-
ferent incubation periods. Our dependent variables measure the occurrence
of a strike in sector A. The only difference between the ﬁve models is the
measurement of the independent variable strike in sector B: whether a
strike occurred in sector B in the previous week ðmodel IÞ, two weeks
ðmodel IIÞ, month ðmodel IIIÞ, quarter ðmodel IVÞ, or half year ðmodel VÞ.
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TABLE 2
Probit Regression of a Strike in Sector A
BASIC MODEL
Week
Two
Weeks Month Quarter
Half
Year
Diffusion variable:
Strike in sector B
ðlogged volumeÞ . . . . . . .003 .002 2.002 2.011** 2.014**
ð.007Þ ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
Sector A variables:
Event counter . . . . . . . . . .016*** .016*** .016*** .016*** .016***
ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
Collective agreement
expirations . . . . . . . . . . .004*** .004*** .004*** .004*** .004***
ð.000Þ ð.000Þ ð.000Þ ð.000Þ ð.000Þ
Economic growth . . . . . . . .007** .007** .007** .007** .006**
ð.002Þ ð.002Þ ð.002Þ ð.002Þ ð.002Þ
Number of companiesa . . . .002 .002 .002 .002 .002
ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
% union members . . . . . . . .010 .010 .010 .010 .010
ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
Period variables:
Inﬂation rate . . . . . . . . . . 2.068 2.068 2.068 2.068 2.067
ð.038Þ ð.038Þ ð.038Þ ð.038Þ ð.038Þ
Unemployment rate . . . . . 2.045 2.045 2.045 2.044 2.044
ð.025Þ ð.025Þ ð.025Þ ð.025Þ ð.025Þ
Share labor party
cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.113 2.113 2.112 2.107 2.105
ð.183Þ ð.183Þ ð.183Þ ð.182Þ ð.182Þ
Day of the week
ðTuesday to Friday 5
referenceÞ . . . . . . . . .
Weekend . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.502*** 2.502*** 2.502*** 2.502*** 2.503***
ð.039Þ ð.039Þ ð.039Þ ð.039Þ ð.039Þ
Monday . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157*** .157*** .157*** .157*** .157***
ð.046Þ ð.046Þ ð.046Þ ð.046Þ ð.046Þ
Dyadic variables:
Skill-level similarity
index ðloggedÞ . . . . . . . . .013 .013 .014 .013 .013
ð.035Þ ð.035Þ ð.035Þ ð.035Þ ð.034Þ
Input-output
index ðloggedÞ . . . . . . . . 2.010 2.010 2.010 2.008 2.008
ð.027Þ ð.027Þ ð.027Þ ð.027Þ ð.027Þ
Labor mobility
index ðloggedÞ . . . . . . . . .070 .070 .071 .072 .072
ð.041Þ ð.041Þ ð.041Þ ð.041Þ ð.041Þ
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.025*** 23.025*** 23.026*** 23.020*** 23.011***
ð.244Þ ð.244Þ ð.244Þ ð.245Þ ð.243Þ
McFadden’s R2 . . . . . . . . . . .16 .16 .16 .16 .16
NOTE.—Robust SEs are in parentheses; clustering in sector A,N5 864,136. McFadden’sR2
is obtained from unclustered probit regression analysis.
a Estimates are multiplied by 1,000.
* P < .05, two-tailed tests.
** P < .01.
*** P < .001.
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The coefﬁcients indicate the change in the z-score of the probit index given a
one-unit increase in the independent variable. We present the robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. The McFadden’s R-squared is reported as a
goodness-of-ﬁt measure for the models.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the diffusion variable. We see that the probability of
a strike occurrence in sector A is not affected by the occurrence of a strike
in sector B ðmeasured as the logged volumeÞ in the past week, two weeks,
or month. Table 2 shows signiﬁcant negative effects of a strike in sector B
for incubation periods longer than a quarter and half a year. Thus, the prob-
ability of a strike in sector A decreases as the ðloggedÞ volume of a strike in
sector B in the past three or six months becomes greater. While this ﬁnding
may initially come as a surprise, it is plausibly a consequence of the oper-
ationalization of the occurrence of the strike in sector B variable. Strike in
sector B measures the logged volume of a strike when such an event has
occurred in sector B during the speciﬁed incubation period. If no strikes took
place during the incubation period or when a strike in sector A occurred
more recently, this variable measures zero. With longer incubation peri-
ods, it is likely that only sectors in which strikes are unusual have nonzero
scores on this variable. As such, the negative relationship between strike
in sector B ðin the past quarter or longerÞ and strike in sector A appears to
be an artifact caused by the measurement of strike in sector B.
Next, we included control variables for sector A characteristics to account
for sectoral explanations of the occurrence of strikes. We account for the
strike proneness of sectors by including an event counter variable that mea-
sures the number of strikes in the past ﬁve years in sector A. We see a strong
positive signiﬁcant effect from the event counter: strikes are more likely to
occur in a sector that is more strike prone. Further, we include the number
of expiring collective agreements in a month. It is expected that strikes are
more likely to occur when the number of monthly expiring collective agree-
ments is higher. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the total number of monthly collec-
tive agreement expirations in sector A increases the likelihood of a strike.
Moreover, as an indication of procyclical strike patterns, we include the eco-
nomic growth in sector A, measured as the change in gross value added. We
see that economic growth positively affects the occurrence of a strike. Further,
the number of companies and the percentage of union members in sector A
are not signiﬁcantly related to the likelihood of strikes in sector A.
Next, we included non-sector-speciﬁc period variables in our models to
account for suprasectoral inﬂuences on the occurrence of temporally clustered
strikes. We ﬁnd that strikes are not signiﬁcantly related to any of the period
variables in our models. Hence, strike occurrence is not affected by inﬂa-
tion rates and unemployment rates or by the share of cabinet portfolios held
by the Dutch Labor Party PvdA. Furthermore, because strikes are less likely
to occur on weekends and are more likely to begin on Mondays, we included
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dummy variables to indicate whether a strike in sector A occurred on the
weekend or on a Monday. Indeed, we ﬁnd that strikes are more likely to
occur on Mondays than on other weekdays and are less likely to occur on
weekends.
Finally, we also included dyadic characteristics. The estimates are shown
only as a prelude to table 3. We expect no direct effect from these variables
because we have no theoretical expectations that strike occurrence in sec-
tor A is affected by merely the similarity or interdependency between sec-
tors A and B. Hence, it is not surprising that we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects
for the dyadic variables on strike occurrence in sector A, regardless of the
demarcation of the incubation periods.
In table 3, we focus on the interactions between strikes in sector B and
the dyadic characteristics. First, we expected that a sector is more likely to
experience a strike if a strike occurred previously in another sector with a
more similarly skilled workforce ðhypothesis 1Þ. We test this hypothesis in
the diffusion by skill-level similarity model ðpanel AÞ. The similarity in the
skill levels of the workforces is measured using the logged skill-level sim-
ilarity index. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant main effects from the occurrence of
strikes in the sectors, regardless of the demarcation of the incubation pe-
riod. Further, the effects of the interactions between the occurrence of a
strike in sector B and the skill-level similarity index are also not signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings imply that the effect of the occurrence of a strike in sector B
on the likelihood of a strike in sector A is not stronger when the skill levels
of the workforces in sectors A and B are more similar. Hence, these ﬁndings
do not corroborate hypothesis 1.
Second, we expected that a strike in one sector is more likely to stimu-
late the occurrence of a strike in another sector when the degree of inter-
dependence in the production or service delivery process between these
sectors is higher ðhypothesis 2Þ. We test this hypothesis in the diffusion by
economic interdependency model ðpanel BÞ. The degree of economic inter-
dependency is measured using the logged input-output index. We ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant negative main effect of the ðloggedÞ volume of a strike in sec-
tor B when measuring the past six months. However, the main effect of the
logged volume of a strike in sector B is not signiﬁcant for the other incu-
bation periods. Further, we ﬁnd that the interaction effects between the
logged volume of a strike in sector B and the input-output index are not
signiﬁcant for any of the incubation periods. Thus, the effect of the logged
volume of a strike in sector B is not conditioned by the degree of economic
interdependency. Our ﬁndings thus do not support the second hypothesis.
Third, we expected that a sector is more likely to experience a strike if
a strike occurred previously in another sector with which labor market
competition is stronger ðhypothesis 3Þ. We test this hypothesis in the diffu-
sion by labor market competition model ðpanel CÞ using the logged labor
American Journal of Sociology
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TABLE 3
Probit Regression of a Strike in Sector A
Week
Two
Weeks Month Quarter
Half
Year
A. Diffusion by Skill Similarity Model
Strike in sector B
ðlogged volumeÞ . . . . . .076 .033 .014 .003 2.009
ð.080Þ ð.080Þ ð.055Þ ð.054Þ ð.052Þ
Skill-level similarity index
ðloggedÞ . . . . . . . . . . . .016 .015 .015 .015 .013
ð.035Þ ð.034Þ ð.035Þ ð.035Þ ð.032Þ
Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . 2.017 2.007 2.004 2.003 2.001
ð.018Þ ð.018Þ ð.013Þ ð.013Þ ð.012Þ
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . 23.037*** 23.033*** 23.032*** 23.027*** 23.014***
ð.245Þ ð.248Þ ð.251Þ ð.252Þ ð.243Þ
McFadden’s R2 . . . . . . .
.16 .16 .16 .16 .16
B. Diffusion by Economic Interdependency Model
Strike in sector B
ðlogged volumeÞ . . . . . 2.006 .004 2.006 2.013 2.019*
ð.017Þ ð.012Þ ð.012Þ ð.008Þ ð.008Þ
Input-output index
ðloggedÞ . . . . . . . . . . 2.011 2.010 2.010 2.009 2.010
ð.027Þ ð.027Þ ð.027Þ ð.028Þ ð.028Þ
Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . .006 2.001 .002 .002 .004
ð.008Þ ð.006Þ ð.007Þ ð.004Þ ð.006Þ
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.023*** 23.026*** 23.024*** 23.018*** 23.008***
ð.245Þ ð.246Þ ð.247Þ ð.247Þ ð.243Þ
McFadden’s R2 . . . . . . .
.16 .16 .16 .16 .16
C. Diffusion by Labor Market Competition Model
Strike in sector B
ðlogged volumeÞ . . . . . 2.014 2.011 2.017* 2.026** 2.031**
ð.010Þ ð.008Þ ð.009Þ ð.010Þ ð.010Þ
Labor mobility index
ðloggedÞ . . . . . . . . . . .068 .067 .067 .066 .065
ð.041Þ ð.041Þ ð.041Þ ð.039Þ ð.038Þ
Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . .016* .012* .013* .015 .017
ð.007Þ ð.006Þ ð.007Þ ð.008Þ ð.009Þ
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.021*** 23.020*** 23.018*** 23.009*** 22.999***
ð.243Þ ð.243Þ ð.244Þ ð.246Þ ð.242Þ
McFadden’s R2 . . . . . . . .16 .16 .16 .16 .16
NOTE.—Robust SEs are in parentheses; clustering in sector A, N 5 864,136. We also con-
trolled for dyadic, sector A, and period variables, identical to the analyses presented in table 2.
For graphic purposes, we present only the main effects and interaction effects. McFadden’s R2
is obtained from unclustered probit regression analysis.
* P < .05, two-tailed tests.
** P < .01.
*** P < .001.
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mobility index as an indicator for competition. Here, we ﬁnd that the main
effect of ðthe logged volume ofÞ a strike in sector B is negative but signiﬁ-
cant only when this strike occurred in the past month or earlier. The effect
of the interaction between ðthe logged volume ofÞ a strike in sector B and
the log of the labor mobility index is positive and signiﬁcant. However, it
loses its statistical signiﬁcance when examining periods of a quarter of a year
and longer.
The signiﬁcant interaction effects appear to be in line with the expecta-
tions of the third hypothesis. The estimates in the probit regression analyses,
especially as compared to logit analyses, can be difﬁcult to interpret. First,
they present the estimated effects of covariates on a latent, nonobserved var-
iable. Second, they indicate a change in the z-score rather than a change in
odds. To facilitate interpretation of the estimated interaction effect between
the logged labor mobility index and the logged volume of a strike in sector B,
we calculated the predicted probability of a strike in sector A for different
values of the logged volume of a strike in sector B while keeping the labor
mobility index at the minimum and maximum values. The marginal effects
of the other covariates are averaged. The predicted probabilities are pre-
sented in ﬁgure 3. We excluded the ﬁgures for the interaction effects with
ðthe logged volume ofÞ a strike in sector B in the past quarter and half year
because we found no signiﬁcant interaction effects with these particular de-
pendent variables.
Figure 3 shows that the predicted probability of a strike in a sector is
rather small: the predicted probability of a strike’s occurrence on a given
day is lower than .018. This ﬁnding is not surprising because the Nether-
lands is known for its relatively small number of strikes. Nevertheless, the
predicted probability strongly depends on the degree of intersectoral labor
mobility and the volume of the strike in sector B. When we compare the
minimum and maximum observed values of the labor mobility index, we
see that the predicted probability of the occurrence of a strike in sector A is
quite similar when there is no strike in sector B during the designated incu-
bation period: for example, we ﬁnd predicted probabilities of .005 ðlow labor
mobilityÞ and .008 ðhigh labor mobilityÞ when there were strikes in sector B
during the past week. The predicted probabilities for sectors with low labor
mobility and high labor mobility diverge as the volume of the strike in sec-
tor B increases. The predicted probability for sectors with low labor mobility
drops to .003. The predicted probability for sectors with high labor mobility
rises to .173, more than twice the predicted probability of a strike in sector A
when there is no strike in sector B. The graphs for the two-week incubation
period and the one-month incubation period present a similar picture. Over-
all, these ﬁndings indicate that for incubation periods up to one month, a
strike in one sector is indeed more likely to stimulate the occurrence of a
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strike in another sector when the degree of intersectoral labor mobility be-
tween these sectors is higher, as predicted by the third hypothesis.
CONCLUSIONS
The current study was designed to determine the extent to which strikes
diffuse across sectors and the extent to which the diffusion of strikes across
sectors can be explained by similarities and interdependencies between sec-
tors. For this purpose, using a series of discrete-time event-history models,
we examined a new, temporally disaggregated, and dyadic database on
strikes in the Netherlands for the 1995–2007 period combined with relevant
time-varying and relational variables on Dutch sectors. This approach en-
abled us to investigate three conditions under which industrial action may
propagate from one sector to another. Building on theories of protest diffu-
sion, we distinguish two mechanisms through which diffusion takes place:
diffusion by learning and diffusion by adaptation. Diffusion by learning is
more likely when sectors are more similar. We therefore expected that strikes
will be more likely to spread between two sectors when these sectors are more
similar in the occupational skill-level composition of their workforce. Dif-
fusion by adaptation is more likely when sectors are economically inter-
dependent. Therefore, we expected that strikes will be more likely to dif-
fuse when sectors exchange more goods and services and through wage
interdependencies created by labor market competition between sectors.
Building on previous studies observing that strikes are not isolated events,
the major contribution of this study is its demonstration that strikes may
spread across sectors of economic activity. However, this study also shows
that this diffusion of strikes does not occur unconditionally but that this
process is likely to be driven by market competition between sectors ðindi-
cated by the degree of intersectoral labor mobilityÞ. We hypothesized that
strike diffusion by labor market competition may occur through adapta-
tion to changes in labor market conditions caused by strikes elsewhere. We
ﬁnd that this effect appears between one week and one month after the be-
ginning of the original strike.
Although, theoretically, adaptation can be distinguished from diffusion
by learning, it proved much harder to separate these mechanisms empir-
ically. With labor mobility as an indicator for labor market competition,
we assumed that employees transfer more easily among sectors that require
similar skills. However, labor mobility may be an indicator not only of labor
market competition but also of workforce similarities, which we assumed
enhances learning. Moreover, learning by information spillover, for exam-
ple, about work practices and employment conditions elsewhere, may occur
via labor mobility ðGörg and Strobl 2005Þ. Considering the institutional
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FIG. 3.—Interaction between strike volume in sector B in the previous period (week,
two weeks, month) and labor mobility (between sector A and B) on the predicted
probability of a strike in sector A. Solid line indicates low labor mobility; broken line
indicates high labor mobility.
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context of the Dutch labor market—labor law prescribes a term of notice
of at least one month for employees as well as for employers—adaptation
through wage competition would require a longer incubation time for strikes
to diffuse. Our ﬁnding that diffusion occurs within one week to one month
therefore cannot rule out that strike diffusion is driven by learning rather
than adaptation because labor mobility may also indicate workforce sim-
ilarities. However, learning via similarity in workforce skill levels did not
yield signiﬁcant results. It appeared that the likelihood of strike diffusion
between two sectors does not increase when these sectors have more in
common with respect to the skill level composition of their workforces. It
may be the case that when employees learn from similar others, they do not
use general skill levels as a reference for comparison but rather compare
themselves with those with equivalent positions in the labor market. In this
respect, labor mobility may capture a more speciﬁc occupational similarity
that is more relevant for the comparison of employment conditions.
With respect to economic interdependency, our ﬁndings indicate that the
exchange of goods and services has no effect on strike diffusion. The notion
that ﬂows of capital may function as a channel of conﬂict diffusion in the in-
dustrial relations arena is therefore not corroborated in this study. That we
ﬁnd no support for diffusion via ﬁnancial interdependency implies that the
disruptive potential of strikes for other sectors should not be overestimated.
This is not to say that strikes do not cause any or even severe disruptions in
the production process elsewhere. It merely indicates that such disruptions
do not lead to new labor conﬂicts.
Our study on the intersectoral diffusion of strikes in the Netherlands con-
stitutes a conservative test of the conditions under which strikes diffuse. If
labor mobility stimulates strike diffusion, it is plausible that this effect also
occurs within sectors because intrasectoral labormobility is often even stronger
than intersectoral mobility ðVan den Berg and Peltzer 2011Þ. In addition, the
Dutch context constitutes a conservative case regarding the generalization
of our ﬁndings to other countries. If the sector-to-sector diffusion of strikes
occurs in a low-strike-frequency country such as the Netherlands, we ex-
pect this phenomenon to be even more pronounced in more strike-prone
countries.
Finally, there are several limitations to this study that need to be con-
sidered. One issue that should be acknowledged concerns the demarcation
of economic sectors. Obviously, whether the clustering of strikes is consid-
ered an inter- or intrasectoral phenomenon is dependent on the deﬁnition of
what constitutes a sector. In this study, we demarcated sectors on the ba-
sis of one-digit SBI classiﬁcations. A more ﬁne-grained demarcation of eco-
nomic activities based on industries or branches ðe.g., two- or three-digit SBI
codesÞ would have enabled us to test our hypotheses in a more stringent
manner. However, it appeared infeasible to conduct the current analyses
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at a lower level of sector aggregation. Essential sector characteristics, includ-
ing relational information between sectors such as statistics on labor mobility,
are not available for more detailed classiﬁcations of economic activity.
Another limitation is that the current study did not address the issue of
geographical proximity ðsee, e.g., Shorter and Tilly 1974Þ. As explained ear-
lier, the available data and the research design do not allow the inclusion of
any measure of spatial proximity. Of course, geographic proximity is related
to the mechanisms of diffusion examined in this study. Labor mobility, for
example, may be more likely between two nearby jobs, and also the transfer
of goods and services may often occur between ﬁrms that are located rel-
atively close to each other. This is not to say, however, that geographical
nearness would necessarily interpret the effect of intersectoral labor mobil-
ity on strike diffusion. More likely, quite the contrary might be true, as geo-
graphic proximity does not explain the underlying diffusion mechanism
ðKarch 2007; Füglister 2011Þ. “Neighbor effects”might occur as a result of
learning ðe.g., by information spillover between two nearby actorsÞ as well
as adaptation ðe.g., by competitionÞ. Hence, following Karch, we may expect
that “even when proximity has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on diffusion,
the source of this relationship remains open to interpretation” ð2007, p. 58Þ.
Moreover, in a study of the Netherlands, the absence of geographical
variables may be less problematic than it might be for larger countries. Lehr,
Akkerman, and Torenvlied ð2015Þ show that during collective bargaining
in the Netherlands, negotiators are hardly inﬂuenced by geographical dy-
namics, such as local employment developments or other negotiations in
the same region. For one, since it is a small country, city-to-city distances in
the Netherlands are all relatively short and travelable within a few hours.
Many Dutch employees do not live in the same city in which they work and
commute to other cities on a daily basis. Strikes, especially in large com-
panies, may therefore already involve workers from different cities. Moreover,
most relevant media have national coverage, which allows news about a strike
to spread easily beyond the immediate environment.
The current study also did not address strike outcomes. A central hy-
pothesis in Conell and Cohn’s ð1995Þ work on French coal mine strikes was
that successful strikes stimulate higher imitation rates than failed strikes. Ac-
tions that end with the employer ðlargely or partiallyÞmeeting the demands
of workers should transmit more relevant information on the favorability of
industrial action. Our study was limited by a lack of consistent information
on the outcomes of strikes. Although the SIN database includes information
on wins and losses on strike actions, this type of information is not available
for approximately 40% of all strike events in the period under study.
We suggest that the diffusion of strikes should be investigated further
in future studies. More research is needed to test the claim that ﬂows of
information along channels between sectors inﬂuence the incidence of strikes.
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Future research could explore whether information on strikes also spreads
across channels other than via labor mobility. For one, if conducted in larger
countries, we recommend that future studies assess the importance of geo-
graphic proximity for the transmission of information. Moreover, the current
analysis was restricted not only to the Netherlands but also to the period 1995–
2007, that is, after the economic crisis of the 1980s and before the crisis of 2008
onward. For future research, it would be interesting to assess the diffusion of
strikes during a time of recession, for instance, because the disruptive power
of strikes may be altered in times of economic hardship. Finally, an actor-
centered focus on employees or employers, which would require data at lower
levels of aggregation, may allow us to directly test the mechanisms underly-
ing diffusion.
APPENDIX
Matrices for Dyadic Variables
TABLE A1
Mean Skill-Level Similarity Index ð1995–2007Þ per Sector Pair
SECTOR B
SECTOR A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. . . .
2. 64.3
3. 79.6 71.7
4. 75.6 85.5 76.7
5. 90.9 67.8 84.0 74.8
6. 82.4 65.7 92.4 70.8 88.0
7. 75.6 48.8 76.7 53.6 78.4 82.8
8. 77.0 61.4 86.0 66.1 84.8 91.3 86.4
9. 64.4 88.0 73.4 86.2 69.1 67.2 50.0 62.6
10. 51.2 80.2 70.0 72.5 55.7 65.8 55.7 65.9 81.9
11. 64.1 87.1 78.4 82.2 69.7 73.2 56.3 68.9 85.0 84.0
12. 20.8 56.0 35.1 43.3 26.4 31.2 21.1 32.6 55.6 65.1 56.7
13. 68.0 89.4 78.8 88.0 73.2 72.7 55.5 68.0 88.8 82.2 93.0 52.7
14. 65.0 81.3 81.8 81.7 69.4 77.0 61.8 74.0 87.2 86.3 88.4 53.3 87.5
NOTE.—Sectors: 1 5 agriculture, hunting, forestry ðAÞ, and ﬁshery ðBÞ; 2 5 mining and
quarrying ðCÞ; 3 5 manufacturing ðDÞ; 4 5 electricity, gas, and water supply ðEÞ; 5 5 con-
struction ðFÞ; 65 wholesale and retail trade ðGÞ; 75 hotels and restaurants ðHÞ; 85 transport,
storage, and communication ðIÞ; 9 5 ﬁnancial intermediation ðJÞ; 10 5 real estate, renting, and
business activities ðKÞ; 11 5 public administration and defense ðLÞ; 12 5 education ðMÞ; 13 5
health and social work ðNÞ; 14 5 other community, social-personal service ðOÞ. Letters in
parentheses are SBI-93 sector classiﬁcations.
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TABLE A2
Mean Input-Output Index ð1995–2007Þ per Sector Pair
SECTOR B
SECTOR A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. . . .
2. .11
3. 14.94 3.38
4. 5.08 24.06 4.35
5. .51 .85 9.49 .80
6. .82 .23 7.31 4.26 1.57
7. .84 .12 3.38 2.44 .41 3.07
8. .93 1.23 5.13 1.54 2.67 9.26 5.27
9. 1.75 .55 3.53 1.17 2.32 7.91 2.78 7.21
10. 1.22 .51 13.04 3.17 10.15 17.00 3.08 10.50 12.03
11. .66 .15 1.90 2.83 7.15 1.27 2.31 7.74 3.30 3.75
12. .11 .14 1.35 1.91 1.06 1.53 1.08 2.15 .83 2.04 7.24
13. 2.13 .06 1.80 2.65 1.28 1.01 2.94 3.19 2.40 3.10 1.76 1.76
14. 1.74 .22 4.22 2.68 2.53 4.66 3.37 3.87 3.19 5.77 .83 1.33 3.59
NOTE.— Sectors: 1 5 agriculture, hunting, forestry ðAÞ, and ﬁshery ðBÞ; 2 5 mining and
quarrying ðCÞ; 3 5 manufacturing ðDÞ; 4 5 electricity, gas, and water supply ðEÞ; 5 5 con-
struction ðFÞ; 65wholesale and retail trade ðGÞ; 75 hotels and restaurants ðHÞ; 85 transport,
storage, and communication ðIÞ; 9 5 ﬁnancial intermediation ðJÞ; 10 5 real estate, renting, and
business activities ðKÞ; 11 5 public administration and defense ðLÞ; 12 5 education ðMÞ; 13 5
health and social work ðNÞ; 14 5 other community, social-personal service ðOÞ. Letters in
parentheses are SBI-93 sector classiﬁcations.
TABLE A3
Mean Labor Mobility Index ð1995–2007Þ per Sector Pair
SECTOR B
SECTOR A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. . . .
2. .24
3. .79 .24
4. .32 .23 .35
5. .77 .25 3.45 .36
6. .88 .24 6.65 .35 2.74
7. .66 .25 1.38 .37 .94 3.46
8. .85 .25 2.58 .38 1.86 4.93 1.69
9. .73 .25 1.23 .38 1.07 1.71 .86 1.53
10. 1.49 .29 5.92 .51 3.31 6.81 2.48 4.80 5.46
11. .84 .25 1.75 .38 1.52 2.01 1.02 1.83 1.48 5.42
12. .67 .24 1.27 .34 1.11 1.49 .84 1.21 .95 2.71 1.45
13. .79 .24 1.91 .35 1.49 2.61 1.45 1.71 10.16 3.35 2.05 2.24
14. .84 .26 1.55 .40 1.28 2.46 1.26 1.75 1.11 3.19 1.67 1.15 1.62
NOTE.—Sectors: 1 5 agriculture, hunting, forestry ðAÞ, and ﬁshery ðBÞ; 2 5 mining and
quarrying ðCÞ; 3 5 manufacturing ðDÞ; 4 5 electricity, gas, and water supply ðEÞ; 5 5
construction ðFÞ; 6 5 wholesale and retail trade ðGÞ; 7 5 hotels and restaurants ðHÞ; 8 5
transport, storage, and communication ðIÞ; 9 5 ﬁnancial intermediation ðJÞ; 10 5 real estate,
renting, and business activities ðKÞ; 115 public administration and defense ðLÞ; 125 education
ðMÞ; 135 health and social work ðNÞ; 145 other community, social-personal service ðOÞ. Letters
in parentheses are SBI-93 sector classiﬁcations.
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